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KRAUSS v. SUPERIOR COURT: A CASE STUDY
ON THE "FAILURE" OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
This comment is an examination of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. The focus, however, is on a single case:
Krauss v. Superior Court.' The case functions as a microcosm
of all that has gone awry in the courts' handling of exclusion.
INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule excludes evidence obtained by unlaw-
ful police practices, in violation of fourth amendment rights.2
Generally, a conconsensual search made without a search war-
rant constitutes an unlawful police practice.' The purpose of the
rule is to deter such practices by removing the incentive to per-
petrate them.4 It is widely held that the exclusionary rule has not
1. 5 Cal. 3d 418, 487 P.2d 1023, 96 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The exclusionary rule was judicially mandated for federal courts in Weeks
v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The remedy was extended to cover state cases
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). California adopted the remedy in
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
3. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptional
circumstances involve either the threat of grave danger to the officer or others
(suspect may possess deadly weapon), or the imminent destruction of evidence,
or both. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search and seizure of stopped vehicle; mobility of
evidence or its container permits no time to procure warrant). Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest: to relieve suspect of
weapons or evidence under his control). Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (hot pursuit: both danger of weapons and evidence of identity).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood alcohol test for drunk driv-
ing suspect).
4. "[Tjhe purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter - to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it.'" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961),
quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) ("to deter the lawless action of the police
and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("to deter violations of the search and
seizure clause"); Krauss v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 418, 424, 489 P.2d 1023,
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succeeded in its purpose, that such practices have not abated
since the adoption of the rule. There is a widespread antagonism
to the use of exclusion.
This comment intends to suggest that this antagonism is the
cause, not the effect, of the rule's apparent inefficacy. The com-
ment is divided into two major sections. The first part will ex-
amine the Krauss case in detail, analyzing its internal logic and
exploring the implications of this logic. The second part is more
general. It will isolate and analyze the standard objections to the
exclusionary rule.
I. THE CASE
Krauss v. Superior Court is an appeal seeking a writ of man-
date to compel suppression of evidence (marijuana). The court,
per Chief Justice Wright, in a 4-3 decision,5 denied the writ,
thereby vacating the 3rd District Court of Appeals grant of the
writ (3-0),' and upholding the trial court. Of the 11 judges
ruling on this issue the majority (6) were in the effective minor-
ity.
The Facts
In the course of cleaning Krauss' motel room, the maid
looked inside a cigarette pack lying on the bedside table to deter-
mine whether it was empty and should be discarded. The inspec-
tion revealed a sandwich bag containing a leafy substance which
the maid, having seen a similar substance at a demonstration
class on drugs, suspected was marijuana. She returned the con-
tents and package to their former position on the nightstand and
notified the motel manager of her discovery. The manager dup-
licated the maid's inspection and then summoned the police.
When, shortly thereafter, Sergeant Guevara arrived, he was in-
formed by both maid and manager of the facts outlined above.
With the manager's permission and accompaniment, Guevara en-
tered Krauss' room and inspected the contents of' the cigarette
package. He restored the marijuana and its containers to the
position in which he found them and departed. That afternoon
1027, 96 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (1971) (Peters, ,J. dissenting) ("to deter
overzealous law enforcement officials from engaging in unlawful searches");
Mann v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 472 P.2d 468, 472, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380,
384 (1970) ("to discourage illegal police conduct in the future").
5. McComb, Mosk and Burke, J.J., concurred in the majority opinion
with Wright, C.J.; Peters, J., filed a vehement dissent, joined by Tobriner and
Sullivan, J.J.
6. Krauss v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 793, 88 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1970).
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Guavara procured a warrant to search Krauss' room. He exe-
cuted the warrant that evening, arresting Krauss and seizing the
marijuana. In his affidavit supporting the warrant, Guevara
omitted any mention of his preliminary search. The affidavit
recited what the maid told him, including the source of her knowl-
edge about marijuana; it also included some hearsay about
Krauss' reputed involvement in the local drug traffic.
The Holding
All the justices hearing this petition 7 concurred on the fol-
lowing points: that the maid's information was lawfully acquired;
that this information was sufficient to support the magistrate's de-
termination of probable cause; that Officer Guevara's preliminary
search was illegal. This last point, however, failed to persuade
the high court to mandate suppression of the evidence. The
search, reasoned the court, was collateral to the progression of
lawful acts that yielded the disputed evidence. Not only could
Officer Guevara have procured the search warrant without the
illegal search, he effectively did so. The ill-gotten knowledge
from the search was not exploited. The magistrate's finding of
probable cause was uncorrupted by this knowledge. Thus, the
search warrant, untainted by the illegal search, broke any link be-
tween the search and the events proceeding from its issuance.
The evidence was the fruit not of the illegal search, but of a
search warranted by an independent determination of probable
cause supported by-and only by-lawfully obtained information.
THE REASONING
The court interlaces two lines of argument: the "Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree" purge-or-exploit test from Wong Sun v. United
States;8 and the "but-for-the-illegality" test.9 The court does not
explicitly advance this latter test either in name, nor, even, in
strict logic. Nonetheless it does use elements of a conglomerate
7. Included in this consensus are the three justices from the court of ap-
peals in addition to the seven on the California Supreme Court.
8. 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). See text accompanying note 13 infra.
9. According to this test, if the evidence would not have been obtained but
for the illegality, then the evidence is excluded; otherwise, it is admitted. The
logic of this test rests on the rationale that the incentive to violate the fourth
amendment exists only when the evidence thereby obtained could not, or would
not, have been procured legally. This same rationale underlies other tests
closely allied with "but-for": "no profit" (if police could have obtained evi-
dence legally, they do not profit from illegality); "sine qua non" (illegality
must be sine qua non for the discovery of evidence); and "inevitable discovery"
(if discovery of evidence was inevitable, illegality will not give rise to exclu-
sion).
[Vol. 13
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of tests which, for the sake of convenience, are herein designated
the "but-for" test. Courts have restated the function of the ex-
clusionary rule with sufficient deviation in language and with suf-
ficient frequency to find themselves basing their decisions on con-
siderations formulated via a series of restatements upon restate-
ments, ten steps removed from the initial understanding. The re-
sult is a tree of many branches, and many decisions will snatch a
few twigs from several diverse branches without tracing them
back to their common source so that they might at least be corre-
lated with one another. This process has spawned a number of
criteria for exclusion, several of which are, by their close associa-
tion, used almost interchangeably, notwithstanding the strained
logic: "but-for," "sine qua non," "inevitable discovery," "no
profit."'" The court incorporates major elements of these tests
into the wholly unrelated Wong Sun test. Any analysis treating
these tests as one coherent argument would become hopelessly
confusing. Therefore, I have extracted from the court's ostensi-
bly one-line thesis the relevant elements marbling its Wong Sun
criteria and gathered them under the heading of the "but-for" test
for separate consideration.
Since the court couches its opinion in terms of the language
from Wong Sun, its use of this test will be analyzed first.11
10. For examples of the vastly varied and conflicting ways these tests are
used, see R. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-the Fourth Amendment and
the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CGIM. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1964). Maguire himself
advances the sine qua non test. Id. at 317. But what does this mean: ab-
sent the illegality the evidence could not have been uncovered or it would not have
been? The difference is crucial, but Maguire does not clarify it. At one point he
states: "The significance of the word 'would' cannot be overemphasized. It is
not enough to show that the evidence 'might' or 'could' have been otherwise
obtained." Id. at 315. But he also asserts that unless the illegality was "in-
dispensable" in obtaining the evidence, exclusion is inapplicable. Id. at 313;
see quote, infra note 26. For criticisms of these tests, see Pitler, "The Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (1968);
Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-a Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 1136 (1967).
11. Concluding that "the initial entry and search by Officer Guevara was
illegal," the court's argument, in full, is as follows: "It does not follow, how-
ever, that the marijuana must be suppressed. Only that evidence which is the
fruit of an illegal search must be excluded. The appropriate question to be an-
swered is '"whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evi-
dence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint."' (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83
S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p.
221). We find no exploitation of the illegal entry in this case.
"Before that entry Sergeant Guevara had lawfully acquired information
from the motel employees that was sufficient to support the issuance of a search
warrant. It was not unlawful for him to use that information to obtain the war-
rant. The magistrate's independent decision to issue the warrant was in no way
tainted by the officer's illegal personal observations, for the magistrate was
1972]
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The Wong Sun, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Test
The court bases its argument on the language of Professor
John M. Maguire, quoted from Wong Sun: 2
[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.18
The court's use of this quote is wholly inappropriate. The quote
describes criteria for an exception to an extension of the exclu-
sionary rule; the court uses it as the test for the rule itself. The
court fails to differentiate among the exclusionary rule, the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine, and the doctrine of attenuation.
The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is a refine-
ment of the rule. 14  It is not the rule itself. Initially, and in its
simplest form, the rule applied only to evidence following directly
from the illegal act. So confined, the rule could be easily circum-
vented: the information acquired from the initial illegality could
wholly unaware of such observations. Although those oservations may have con-
tributed to Officer Guevara's decision to secure the warrant, he did not thereby
exploit them within the meaning of Wong Sun. Thus in Mann v. Superior
Court (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380, 472 P.2d 468, we held that an
occupant's subsequent consent to an entry motivated by an asserted prior il-
legal observation dispelled any taint flowing from that observation. Similarly
the magistrate's independent evaluation of Officer Guevara's affidavit dispelled
any taint flowing from his original entry. To hold otherwise would go beyond
excluding evidence unlawfully obtained and in effect grant petitioner immunity
from prosecution because of the officer's collateral wrong. [cite omitted].
"People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1106, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458
P.2d 713, is not to the contrary. In that case the officer's decision to make an
arrest without a warrant was based on both legally and illegally obtained evidence,
and we held that it could not be sustained in the absence of a showing that the
officer could lawfully have made the arrest and would have done so on the
basis of the legally obtained evidence alone. In the present case the magistrate
issued the warrant solely on the basis of sufficient legally obtained evidence.
The marijuana found in petitioner's room is thus the product of a search sanc-
tioned by a warrant issued upon knowledge lawfully obtained by means distin-
guishable from the unlawful search and is not come at by exploitation of that
illegality." Krauss v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 418, 422-23, 487 P.2d 1023,
1026-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. 455, 458-59 (1971).
12. 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), quoting J. MAGuIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT,
221 (1959).
13. 5 Cal. 3d at 422, 487 P.2d at 1026, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
14. The phrase was introduced in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939). The concept underlying the phrase, however, was recognized
nearly two decades earlier, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920): "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. . . . the knowledge
gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used ....... Id. at 392.
For a comprehensive history of the doctrine, its uses and abuses, see Pit-
ler, supra note 10.
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lead to other evidence that is the direct product of an act wholly
proper in itself. The evidence from the initial illegality is the poi-
sonous tree; the secondary evidence is the fruit of that tree. 5
This fruit is subject to exclusion just as the tree is; it is poisoned
by the same illegality.
Whenever the fruit becomes so removed from the initial ille-
gality that its exclusion would not deter future violations, even
though the illegality is the sine qua non for its discovery, it is not
excluded. This is the doctrine of attenuation.' 6  It is an excep-
tion to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine as literally defined;
it is no exception, of course, to the doctrine as substantively de-
fined. The test of attenuation is whether suppression of the fruits
will promote the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
The question of attenuation arises only when there is poten-
tially a fruit of the poisonous tree problem, which presupposes the
elements of both an initial illegality and evidence distinct from
and secondary to that disclosed directly by that illegality; of
course if attenuation exists, the evidence at issue is, by definition,
not the fruit of the tree. Once the police have uncovered evidence
by unlawful means, the victim of that illegality is not thereafter
immune to the effectual use of all evidence that might be subse-
quently, even consequently, uncovered. By what criteria evidence
otherwise definable as fruit from the poisonous tree escapes cor-
ruption from that tree is the question addressed by the Maguire
quote.
Maguire is proffering a guide for determining that degree of
attenuation sufficient to, or necessary to, except merely technical
fruits of illegality from the sanction of the exclusionary rule. The
passage is quoted in Wong Sun in precisely this sense. 17  The pre-
15. Pitler, supra note 10, at 581. If the marijuana observed in the unlawful
search had led Guevara to the discovery of other evidence, that other evidence
would be secondary evidence, fruit derived from the evidence uncovered in the
initial search. The marijuana is primary, not secondary, evidence. As Peters
points out in his dissent, since there is no secondary evidence involved in
Krauss, the Fruit doctrine is inapplicable. 5 Cal. 3d at 427, 487 P.2d at 1029-
30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
16. Justice Frankfurter introduced the doctrine in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939): "Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connec-
tion between [the illegality and the proffered evidence] . . . . As a matter of
good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint." Id. at 341.
17. The Court in Wong Sun applied the test to Wong Sun's co-petitioner,
Toy, only after first establishing that the evidence would not in fact have been
discovered absent the illegality. Immediately preceding the test as Krauss ex-
tracted it (see text accompanying note 8 supra), Wong Sun states: "We need not
hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would
not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is 'whether . . . .'" 371 U.S. at 487-88.
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sumption is that exclusion applies, since the evidence is techni-
cally-though perhaps not operationally-fruit of the poisonous
tree. The Wong Sun passage indicates criteria for finding an ex-
ception to the rule. Wright, conversely, presumes the inappli-
cability of the rule, and uses this same passage as criteria for
finding the exceptional circumstances in which the rule does ap-
ply. So Krauss must meet the burden of the exception rather
than the rule.
Krauss does not involve the question of fruit at all.18  There
is no secondary evidence, only primary evidence. But even if
Krauss did involve a fruit of the poisonous tree situation, the
Wong Sun quote is inapplicable. The illegality can not be purged
prospectively. The illegality is primary, to be exploited or purged
by subsequent acts or events, not prior ones. Since even Wright
must recognize that the purger must follow the purgee, he casts
the magistrate's finding of cause in the role of purging the taint
of the entry. Nonetheless, the material necessary to obtain the
magistrate's finding was not gathered subsequent to the search.
The court tries to support the applicability of Wong Sun to
Krauss by suggesting their shared analogy to a third case. 19 The
suggested parallel between Wong Sun and Mann v. Superior
Court2" is sound. Wong Sun's voluntary return to confess to the
police is comparable to the consent in ,Mann: both acts were
voluntarily performed by the defendants subsequent to, and inde-
The only question was attenuation, not whether the evidence was discoverable
independently of the illegality.
Contrarily, Wright uses this same test-a test predicated on the assump-
tion that illegality was the sine qua non for acquiring the evidence-to argue
that the illegality was not a necessary step in uncovering the evidence.
18. Accord, Peters' dissent, 5 Cal. 3d at 427, 487 P.2d at 1029-30, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 461-62. Contra, the appeals court holding, but it required an intervening
act to purge the taint. Krauss v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 793, 801, 88
Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (1970).
19. Officer Guevara "did not . . . exploit . . . within the meaning of
Wong Sun. Thus in Mann v. Superior Court. . . we held that an occupant's sub-
sequent consent to an entry motivated by an asserted prior illegal observation
dispelled any taint flowing from that observation. Similarly the magistrate's
independent evaluation of Officer Guevara's affidavit dispelled any taint flowing
from his original entry." 5 Cal. 3d at 423, 487 P.2d at 1026, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
458.
20. 3 Cal. 3d 1, 472 P.2d 468, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1023 (1971). in Mann, police, without cause, spied through a gap in the
window shades into the living room of a private house and saw evidence of
marijuana use. There was a party in progress, with frequent comings and
goings. The officers followed on the heels of someone else's entry and, knocking
upon the door, heard two voices shout "Come in". They entered and, before
the occupants could object, smelled marijuana fumes, which evidence the court,
per Chief Justice Wright, held was born of the consent itself and instantan-
eously established the requisite cause to remain in the house to search and arrest
those present.
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pendent of, the police illegality. Though technically fruits of the
preceding illegalities, they intervened as independent acts, able to
stand alone without reference to prior events. As these acts in
Mann and Wong Sun purged the taint of the previous illegalities,
similarly, proposes the court, the magistrate's independent evalu-
ation in Krauss purges the taint of Guevara's search.
The analogy fails. The magistrate's finding cannot stand
independently of the events leading up to it, including the search.
The confession of Wong Sun and the consent of Mann are causes
in themselves; the magistrate's evaluation is merely a showing of
cause. The acts of Mann and Wong Sun were voluntary acts of
the defendants. If official action alone can purge the illegality,
the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine is nullified.
That degree of 'attenuation' which suffices to remove the
taint from evidence obtained directly as a result of unlawful
police conduct requires at least an intervening independent
act by the defendant or a third party which breaks the causal
chain linking the illegality and evidence in such a way that
the evidence is not in fact obtained 'by exploitation of that
illegality.' 21
The magistrate's evaluation hardly intervenes to break the pre-
ceding from the succeeding events; if anything, the court urges
the opposite thesis. On the one hand the magistrate's evaluation
establishes that Guevara could have procured a warrant absent
the illegal entry; on the other, it dispels the taint of that entry.
The same act cannot simultaneously establish the causally direct
unfolding of events independent of the illegality, while interven-
ing to purge the effects of that illegality; the latter presupposes
that the illegality is a necessary step in the progression of events-
why else would it need to be purged?
The "But-for-the-Illegality" Test
Notwithstanding its pervasive use of Maguire's language,
substantively the court relies on some variant of the "but-for"
test for exclusion: whether the evidence could and would have
been obtained but for the illegal entry. The court employs the
Maguire language to fill out, if not obscure, the gaps in a straight
21. People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418, 428, 439 P.2d 321, 328, 67 Cal. Rptr.
409, 416 (1968) (emphasis added). Accord, People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541,
548, 450 P.2d 865, 869, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1969); Krauss v. Superior Court,
9 Cal. App. 3d 793, 801, 88 Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (1970); See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963); Raymond v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d
321, 327, 96 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1971); Pitler, supra note 10, at 592.
If the requisite intervention can be contrived through the deliberate acts of
the offending officer, then the causal link is hardly attenuated.
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"but-for" test. The "but-for" test logically requires that the evi-
dence not only could have been obtained independently of the il-
legal act but also would have been.
Distinguishing the instant case from People v. Edwards
2
wherein evidence obtained both legally and illegally led to an ar-
rest, Wright states that the arrest "could not be sustained in the
absence of a showing that the officer could lawfully have made
the arrest and would have done so on the basis of the legally ob-
tained evidence alone. '23  Instead of distinguishing the instant
case in terms of could and would, Wright substitutes the phrases
"by means distinguishable from" and "not come at by exploita-
tion of," respectively.24 The interchange of 'could' and 'by means
22. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). In Ed-
wards, the defendant's neighbor, a Mr. Hansen, reported seeing what he surmised
to be marijuana on Edwards' porch to Officer Hem. Hansen's information was
comparable to the maid's in Krauss. Hem searched Edwards' trash cans wherein
he uncovered a bag of marijuana. Subsequently, he and other officers
staked out the house until Edwards' return, knocked on the door, and, in re-
sponse to Edwards' suspicious reaction to their presence, entered, arrested Ed-
wards and his wife, searched the house, and found marijuana and L.S.D.
The court held that the search of the trash can was illegal. There were
two separate acquisitions of evidence in Edwards: the marijuana found in the
trash, and the hallucinogens found in the search incident to the arrests. The
former is comparable to the evidence in Krauss. But in Edwards, once the court
decided the searching of the trash was illegal, it summarily concluded that the
evidence thereby uncovered was inadmissible. The court never considered for
an instant whether that evidence could or would have been discovered absent
the search. 71 Cal. 2d at 1105, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
Since, however, Wright, for some unfathomable reason, considered Krauss
as a "fruit" problem, presumably his reference to Edwards concerns that court's
holding on the admissibility of the evidence discovered incident to the arrests.
Contrary to Wright's analogy here, however, the court was not concerned with
whether that evidence could have been obtained by wholly lawful means. The
court conceded that the information lawfully acquired from informant Hansen
could consitute probable cause to arrest Edwards and search his house, but the
question was whether, without the corroborating evidence gleaned from the ille-
gal search, the officers would have done so. "Whether on the basis of
Hansen's report alone the officers would have . . . conducted the lengthy
stakeout, and then . . . made . . . the arrests and subsequent discovery of
marijuana and L.S.D. is a matter of speculation . . . . Thus even if it be
assumed that there was probable cause for the arrest of ... the defendants
apart from the evidence found in the search of the trash can, the prosecution
has failed to establish that the evidence found after the arrests was not 'come
at by exploitation of' the prior illegal search, and the evidence should therefore
have been excluded." (emphasis added). 71 Cal. 2d at 1106, 458 P.2d at 719,
80 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
23. 5 Cal. 3d at 423, 487 P.2d at 1026-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 458-459 (em-
phasis added).
24. "In the present case the magistrate issued the warrant solely on the basis
of sufficient legally obtained evidence. The marijuana found in petitioner's
room is thus the product of a search sanctioned by a warrant issued upon
knowledge lawfully obtained by means distinguishable from the unlawful
search and is not come at by exploitation of that illegality." Id. at 423, 487
P.2d at 1027, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
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distinguishable from' is, in this context, clear enough: if evidence
could be obtained independent of an illegality, one might prop-
erly state that it is obtainable "by means distinguishable from"
that illegality. The correlation between 'would' and 'exploitation'
is confusing-especially in context.
In any commonsense use of the word would, it is certaintly
not clear that Officer Guevara would have procured the warrant
"on the basis of the legally obtained evidence alone. '2 5' The
court apparently agrees:
Although those observations [made in the search] may have
contributed to Officer Guevara's decision to secure the war-
rant, he did not thereby exploit them within the meaning of
Wong Sun.2
6
The court hereby contradicts half of its two criteria in distin-
guishing this case from Edwards. We are left with a qualified
"but-for" test of exclusion: one of potentiality rather than ac-
tuality.2 7  The court's "but-for" test might more accurately be
called the "he-could-have-anyway" test.
What does the court mean by exploitation "within the mean-
ing of Wong Sun"? The court continues:
Thus in Mann v. Superior Court. . . we held that an occu-
pant's subsequent consent to an entry motivated by an as-
serted prior illegal observation dispelled any taint flowing
from that observation. Similarly the magistrate's independ-
ent evaluation of Officer Guevara's affidavit dispelled any
taint flowing from his original entry. 28
In Mann v. Superior Court,29 the illegality was the sine qua non
for the evidence. By analogy, even if Officer Guevara declared
as a fact that the search was the sine qua non of his getting a war-
rant, the officer would still not be exploiting that illegality. It is
25. Id. Nor was it clear to Justice Peters: "There is nothing in the record
to indicate that he was satisfied with their information and would have sought
the warrant if he had not first verified their information by the unlawful search."
Id. at 428, 487 P.2d at 1030, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 462 (dissenting opinion). Nor to
the court of appeals: "It cannot be determined whether he would have secured
the warrant . . .if he had not made the prior, illegal search." Krauss v. Su-
perior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 793, 801, 88 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1970).
26. 5 Cal. 3d at 423, 487 P.2d at 1026, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 458. Cf. R. Ma-
guire, supra note 10, at 313: if the illegal act "merely contributed to the dis-
covery .... In other words, if . . . the illegal act was not an indispensable
cause of the discovery of the proffered evidence, the exclusionary rule does not
apply." (emphasis added).
27. "The test must be one of actualities, not possibilities." United States v.
Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1962).
28. 5 Cal. 3d at 423, 487 P.2d at 1026, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 458. (emphasis
added).
29. 3 Cal. 3d 1, 472 P.2d 468, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1970). For summary of
facts of Mann, see note 20 supra.
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the magistrate's determination of probable cause that constitutes
the showing-decisively absent in Edwards-that Officer Gue-
vara could have obtained the evidence absent the unlawful entry.
But the passage cited above accords this determination even
greater impact: the very act establishing the element of could
renders irrelevant the element of would. 0 Thus, according to
the court, any exploitation of an illegal search is not an exploita-
tion "within the meaning of Wong Sun" if it can be shown that
exploitation was not indispensable to its outcome.
The court needs the wondrous powers of the Wong Sun lan-
guage to charm away the common sense distinctions between
could and would. In order to distinguish Edwards,"' the court
must include the element of would: the court in Edwards con-
ceded, arguendo, that the offending officers probably could have
obtained the evidence in question absent the illegal act, so the
question of whether they would have was crucial. On the other
hand, in order to satisfy its interpretation of the Wong Sun test,
the court need only maintain that the illegality was not necessary
to obtain evidence, reasoning that one does not exploit, or profit
by, illegal means to an end if that end could have been se-
cured absent those means. Thus it is utilizing tests in contradic-
tory ways in order to suit its particular ends.
THE PROBATIVE FUNCTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter official vio-
lations of fourth amendment rights. Under the Krauss interpre-
tation of the rule, only half of these rights are so protected: free-
dom from searches without probable cause, but not freedom from
warrantless searches. In effect, Krauss holds that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to searches for which probable cause is
establishable. And, excepting those exceptional situations where-
in warrantless searches are lawful, 2 probable cause is establisha-
ble only by the disinterested determination of a magistrate. The
court would therefore immunize all probable cause searches from
30. Emphasizing the element of could to the detriment of would is in di-
rect conflict with Edwards. Edwards turned not on whether the evidence could
have been obtained absent the illegal search, but whether it would have been.
31. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). The court
of appeals, which granted Krauss' writ, relied heavily on the "analogous circum-
stances" of People v. Edwards, a reliance which probably induced Wright to take
on the ill-fated task of distinguishing these two cases to counteract those
"analogous circumstances" so evident to the lower court., 9 Cal. App. 3d
793, 800-01, 88 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1970). Note also Justice Peters' analysis
of Edwards in his dissent in the instant case. 5 Cal. 3d at 428, 487 P.2d at
1030, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 462 n.1. See note 22 infra.
32. See note 3 supra.
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the scope of the exclusionary rule. If the search could have been
lawful, it effectively should be. The question is only one of es-
tablishing probable cause. And this is the function of the search
warrant, a purely probative one. This viewpoint follows Krauss'
validation of curing warrants: their probative function is not, pre-
sumably, diminished by their timing.
In light of the role the search warrant plays for the court,
perhaps it does not consider the warrant process as involving sub-
stantive fourth amendment rights, but rather as a procedure
whereby substantive rights can be assessed. Yet the court places
controlling importance upon the warrant process: what import
has probable cause if it eludes definition? The warrant process
serves to give it definition. Thus, though the lawfulness of a
search is substantially determined by probable cause, it is oper-
ationally determined by the warrant process.
Legion are the searches based on probable cause-on cer-
tain cause-unblessed by a warrant and thus subject to the ex-
clusionary rule."3 To those for whom security from warrantless
searches is deemed a substantive Constitutional right properly
within the purview of the exclusionary rule, the disparity between
actual probable cause and that recognized by warrant is an ac-
ceptable reality. To those of Wright's persuasion, this disparity
must be frustrating. For the former group the rule is applied in
accordance with one of its purposes: to discourage warrantless
searches. For the latter, the rule is at odds with its purpose as
that group envisaged it: to discourage searches without probable
cause.
The Probative Search Warrant is Not Probative
The magistrate's independent determination of probable
cause is crucial to Wright's decision. Without it, even multitudi-
nous indices of cause are ineffectual. By validating the curative
warrant, Wright has emphasized the strictly probative function of
the warrant process. Yet, the very source of this emphasis, the
33. Perhaps the most dramatic example of searches based indisputably upon
probable cause, but subject nonetheless to the sanctions of exclusion, is the
search incident to an arrest that extends beyond the areas delimited by Chimel v.
California. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). Commonly in such cases ex-
clusion need not alter the ultimate outcome of the prosecution, since the re-
maining admissible evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. But in many
others, wherein the cause to search arises from and is limited to information about
the specific evidence sought in the search (as in Krauss), exclusion can elimi-
nate the only evidence available to the prosecution. E.g., Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
Raymond v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 321, 96 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1971).
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curative warrant, whose only possible purpose is probative, none-
theless dilutes the probative efficacy of the warrant process.
In order to show that Guevara could have procured a war-
rant absent the search, Wright must extrapolate from the magis-
trate's evaluation the outcome of a hypothetical earlier evaluation
and grant that derived evaluation the probative efficacy of an ac-
tual one. By so doing, Wright invades the magistrate's realm
and divests the warrant process of its remaining raison d'etre.84
Notwithstanding compelling indices of probable cause, if a magis-
trate does not conclude it, or he could have considered improper
data in so concluding, courts have traditionally refused to substi-
tute their own judgment for that of the magistrate. Courts should
not speculate on what the magistrate could or would or might
have decided.3 5  Wright, who undoubtedly supports this policy,
34. If a magistrate's evaluation after the discovery of evidence can be as
valid-or probatively efficacious-as one before, is there any rationale for confin-
ing the magistrate's function to the timing and sequence of the particular events
in Krauss? For those who value the warrant requirement as a substantive
constitutional protection, the timing presents no problem: warrants must issue
before the search; the fourth amendment itself authorizes drawing the line at
this point. But once the ex post facto warrant is validated, whence comes the
authority for drawing the line at one point rather than another? That police
can illegally search but not seize before getting a warrant? Why? By what
standard? If the warrant process is merely probative, why require it at all in
cases of incontrovertible probable cause? Supra note 33. Or as the dis-
senting Justice Peters suggests, in response to the majority logic, how "wasteful
and inefficient" it is to require a second search so long as the officer can show
that he could have procured the evidence legally, notwithstanding his unlawful
search: to wit, "since the 'taint' could be cured, it should be deemed 'cured'."
5 Cal. 3d at 429, 487 P.2d at 1031, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
If, when the unlawfully secured information is withheld from the magistrate,
he can effectively adjudicate probable cause, why not require courts to refer all
instances of illegally derived evidence to a magistrate for those illegal acts
before exclusion is considered? If Guevara could restrict his affidavit to the
maid's information after the search, why could he not do the same after a search,
seizure and arrest? In People v. Edwards, for example, why not present an ig-
norant magistrate with the knowledge gleaned lawfully from informant Hansen
and ask the magistrate to adjudicate whether this information constitutes
probable cause to arrest Edwards? 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1969). See note 22 supra. Would this ex post facto showing of
cause in Edwards differ in kind from that in Krauss? The difference is only
one of timing. And despite popular myths to the contrary, there is no proof
of a direct correlation between one's temporal proximity to an experience and
his accurate recall of it.
35. If courts were to so speculate, or give effect to their speculations after
the fact, the warrant requirement would be nugatory: "Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to is-
sue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a war-
rant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes
secure only in the discretion of police officers." Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948). As the Johnson case, wherein the Court conceded that
probable cause for the search was present, points out: "If the officers in this
case were excused from the constitutional duty of presenting their evidence
to a magistrate, it is difficult to think of a case in which it should be required."
Id. at 15. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766-67 n.12 (1969).
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nonetheless contradicts it with his validation of the ex post facto
warrant.
The magistrate's evaluation in Krauss establishes only that
Guevara had, at that time, probable cause to search. This deter-
mination is not equivalent to the magistrate's making the same
determination prior to the search. The latter would be conclusive
in showing Guevara had probable cause and could get a warrant
independent of the search. The former determination is not so
conclusive. The disparity between "this is X" and "I would have
said 'this is X'" can be nulled only by speculation. Wright nulls
it with innocence: the controlling variable is the search; by equat-
ing the fact of the search with the knowledge of the search,
Wright concludes that the magistrate's determination in ignor-
ance of the search is equivalent to his determination in absence of
the search. The magistrate's ignorance, however, does not dispel
the possibility of influence by means less direct than full disclo-
sure.
When all the facts bearing on his decision are spelled out for
his conscious consideration, the magistrate is at least potentially
able to extract the proper from the improper data and shape a
judgment uncontaminated by the latter. The subtle influences
of relevant knowledge withheld elude all possibility of extraction.
Why should an interested law enforcement officer be more trusted
to prevent tainted data from influencing his affidavit than a dis-
interested magistrate is to prevent overtly tainted data from in-
fluencing his deliberations?
THE LOGICAL EFFECT OF KRAUSS ON POLICE CONDUCT
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is, according to Wright,
"to discourage illegal police conduct in the future."3 6 Presuma-
bly Wright would exclude any evidence gleaned from either
searches executed wholly without probable cause (which, by defi-
nition, are unsanctioned by a warrant), or searches for which
probable cause is not establishable. But how will these criteria for
exclusion "discourage illegal police conduct?" The search in
Krauss was illegal. Yet the rule was not applied there. What il-
legal searches will be discouraged or otherwise affected by
Wright's selective application of the exclusionary rule?
Encouragement for the Exploratory Search
The cause for a search is either probable or improbable. If
probable, under Krauss the police have nothing to lose and some-
36. Mann v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 472 P.2d 468, 472, 88 Cal. Rptr.
380, 384 (1970).
19721
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
thing to gain by searching first and getting a warrant later. Prob-
able does not mean certain. Even when the police officer is cer-
tain his information constitutes probable cause, his certainty does
not assure discovery of the expected fruits. If there is any
chance, however slight, that the suspected contraband will not
be uncovered, the officer will benefit from searching first. If the
search refutes his information, he has saved himself the chore of
procuring a warrant; if the search confirms his information, he
can proceed to get a warrant with certainty of success.
Justice Peters, in his dissent, argues that the benefit to be
gained from searching before seeking a warrant (or deciding not to)
accrues primarily to those officers lacking probable cause to
search.3 7 However, Peters seems to equate the cause to search with
the outcome of that search, reasoning as follows: if the information
is incorrect or its implications are not borne out by the search, the
searcher is saved the burden of getting a warrant; while, if con-
traband is indeed found, the searcher does not benefit since he
must get a warrant anyway. But probable cause does not guar-
antee that contraband will be found; nor, improbable cause, that
it will not. The real benefit comes from eliminating the uncer-
tainty before seeking a warrant, not from avoiding the warrant al-
together. The benefit arises from the search itself. Before the
search, the officer does not know the outcome. The question of
deterrence precedes the search.
Contrary to Peters' reasoning, the officer who searches with
out probable cause is least benefited by the Krauss holding. The
search does not save him the burden of getting a warrant, because
he knows he cannot get one anyway and would not try. On a
mere "hunch", as Peters calls it, no officer will pursue the patently
futile course of seeking a search warrant. How can the search
"save" him a burden he would not have undertaken anyway? He
is saved nothing. It is only those searches for which a warrant
could have been secured which can save police the burden of ob-
taining-or executing-a warrant in vain.
Where probable cause is patently lacking, the officer has
nothing to lose by undertaking illegal searches."' The exclusion
37. 5 Cal. 3d at 425-26, 487 P.2d at 1028-1029, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 460-61.
38. The vast majority of these legally baseless searches are beyond the
direct reach of the exclusionary rule no matter how construed. Obviously
some, perhaps many, simply fail to produce evidence. But even those that do
are rarely subjected to judicial scrutiny. The motivation for many of these
searches is harassment, not prosecution. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 721-22 (1970); Pitler, supra
note 10, at 586.
Of those aimed at prosecution, a groundless search can, upon the dis-
covery of evidence, motivate subsequent surveillance or other action leading
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of evidence thereby discovered constitutes no loss: absent the
lawless search, the evidence would not have been discovered any-
way. The offending officer's superiors are as likely as not to
shrug off such an offense. These superiors, if anyone, are going
to pressure the officer into scrupulous conduct. But such pres-
sure is likely to be exerted only when the officer bungles a prose-
cution by warrantlessly searching with probable cause. 0 When-
ever the officer could have obtained the incriminating evidence
lawfully, but instead procured it unlawfully, the exclusion of that
evidence deprives the officer of something he need not have lost.
The very fact that the means open to him can make a difference
is sufficient to exert some influence on his subsequent conduct.
In contrast, whenever he lacks the option to obtain evidence law-
fully, the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained effects no less
the desired end than had he abstained from the unlawful conduct.
The efficacy of the exclusionary rule lies in its application
not to illegal searches without probable cause, but to illegal
searches with probable cause. If warrantless searches themselves
were targets of the exclusionary rule, then illegal searches based
on some degree of cause are those most likely to be deterred by
the threat of exclusion. Where there is cause to search, there is
also the most at stake in the decision to seek a warrant. Lacking
certainty, the officer faces the possibility either of being denied a
warrant or of executing it 'in vain. On the other hand, since he
has cause to believe incriminating evidence will be uncovered,
and lawfully can be, he has something to lose in not pursuing
a warrant. Krauss, in removing any penalty for warrantless
searches per se, openly invites preliminary searches to establish
certain cause before seeking a warrant.
The Illegal Search Itself is Unaffected
If Guevara's search had failed to confirm the maid's suspi-
cions, the episode would have ended there, adding one more ille-
gal entry to the unknown number. Would Wright like to deter
such a search? It would be unblessed by establishable probable
cause, and thus a search of the type his exclusionary rule aims to
to the "lawful" acquisition of evidence, as in Mann v. Superior Court. 3 Cal.
3d 1, 472 P.2d 468, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1970). See summary note 20 supra.
Or, once their "hunches" are borne out by the search, some police may manu-
facture probable cause independent of the search. See Chevigny, Police
Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRiM. L. BULL.
3 (1969); Oaks, supra at 739-42; Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3 CRIM. L.
BULL. 551 (1967).
39. Oak's study suggests that the exclusionary rule is most effective when
prosecution is most probable, especially in cases of serious crime "where public
interest and awareness are high." Oaks, supra note 38, at 731.
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deter. Unfortunately, however, this type of search never comes
before the court unless it uncovers evidence and, not infrequently,
is cleansed, as in Krauss, by subsequent events. Of course the
search is not made any more or less unlawful by the happen-
stance of its outcome. But in Krauss' scheme, the quality of that
illegality depends on what it produces. Here the same unlawful
search will constitute that particular kind of illegal conduct the
exclusionary rule covers wholly on the basis of events following
that search: the end justifies the means. But how can the rule
deter future searches if the rule's application is determinable only
after the search is executed? It must apply to the search, the illegal-
ity itself. The only way to deter that fruitless search that eludes
scrutiny, is to apply sanctions against those similar-though fruit-
ful-searches that do come before the court.
Of course the Krauss logic will subject some fruitful lawless
searches to the sanctions of the exclusionary rule. But its criteria
for so doing will not only not deter fruitless illegal searches, it
will not deter fruitful ones either, including ones identical to those
acted against. Its criteria simply have no bearing on the illegal
act itself. The illegal search merely raises the issue. Exclusion
turns not on the illegal act itself, but rather on acts performed
subsequent to it. Krauss turns on two of Guevara's post-search
acts: one of commission and one of omission. The former, upon
which the latter depends, is Guevara's decision to seek a war-
rant. Thus, one target of exclusion, according to Krauss, is to deter
failure to seek a warrant after searching unlawfully-not failure to
get one before searching; just after. Guevara's other decisive act is
his perjury by omission, in withholding the fact of the search from
the magistrate.40 Had he included this fact in his affidavit, the evi-
dence most assuredly would have been excluded. 4 As it is, by per-
40. In his dissent Justice Peters registers his clear disapproval of the ma-jority's rewarding this "concealment of information known to the officer bearing
so clearly and directly on the issue of probable cause", the determination of
which is, after all, the magistrate's sole function. 5 Cal. 3d at 427, 487 P.2d
at 1029, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 461. The majority conspicuously abstains from com-
menting on the propriety of Guevara's tactics.
41. The majority not only fails to bestow even the mildest remonstrance
upon Guevara for his less-than-scrupulous affidavit, but the court relies heavily
and directly upon this deceptive omission to support its finding againt exclu-
sion and, coincidently, in favor of Guevara's deceit. Thus Guevara achieved
the precise end he sought in perpetrating the deceit: circumventing the
exclusionary rule's sanction against his illegal search.
There can be no reasonable doubt that Guevara's mentioning the search in
his affidavit would have reversed the Krauss holding. Wright's logic is too en-
trenched in the fact of Guevara's omission to imagine that he had another argu-
ment to support the conclusion without this omission.
See Raymond v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 321, 96 Cal. Rptr. 678
(1971). In Raymond, under circumstances comparable to Krauss, the warrant
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petrating, under oath, a calculated falsehood, the rule does not ap-
ply: verily, an example of two wrongs making a right. That any
holding based on the exclusionary rule could turn on so anomal-
ous a distinction is breathtaking. This distinction not only fails
to discourage the underlying illegal act, but further rewards an
additional unethical, if not illegal, practice.
The offensiveness of the search is in no way mitigated by
whether the offending officer thereafter files an incomplete affidavit
or otherwise obtains a warrant. If exclusion is denied on grounds
extraneous to the illegal search, then exclusion will be imposed
only on grounds extraneous to the illegal search. If parents re-
mark in passing that they do not want their child to eat candy,
but in fact never penalize him so long as he brushes his teeth after
eating it, what conduct is affected when they do penalize him for
eating candy? The parents may say the punishment is directed
against the candy consumption, but the child will not be con-
vinced. He will be deterred not from eating candy, but from fail-
ing to brush his teeth afterwards. Nor, following the logic of
Krauss, will police be convinced that excluding evidence derived
from an illegal search based on cause is directed against the ille-
gal search. Just as effectively as have those hypothetical parents
negated any sanctions against candy consumption, Krauss negates
any sanctions the exclusionary rule might impose against illegal
searches based on cause.
II. THE CASE FOR EXCLUSION
What then is left of the exclusionary rule? Warrantless
searches upon probable cause are either cured or, being curable,
are penalized only for not having been cured. Searches executed
without cause are virtually immune to the rule. 2 Behind the
smokescreen of catch phrases from Wong Sun lies the real logic
of Krauss: distrust of the exclusionary rule. The court is unwill-
ing to pay the price necessary for deterrence: letting criminals go
free. And it is likely sympathetic with that not insignificant num-
ber of critics who doubt the efficacy of the rule." But, since
-and, consequently, the subsequent search-was invalidated on precisely this
point: the officer included the fact of his preliminary search in his affidavit.
42. With one notable exception: since the rule's adoption, police no longer
unabashedly admit to obtaining evidence under circumstances that "shock
the conscience." Infra note 69. If elimination of at least the flaunting of
fourth amendment violations is the purpose of the rule, then it has been an un-
qualified success. See note 38 supra.
43. The most distinguished and perhaps the most determined of doubters is
Mr. Chief Justice Burger. See, for example, his extended attack on the rule in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (dissenting opin-
ion). Those who contend the rule is ineffectual are numerous. If this number
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the court cannot thumb its nose at the dictates of Mapp v. Ohio44
singlehandedly, it does the next best thing: whenever possible, it
avoids exclusion. Thus the opinion focuses not on the rule, but
on its exception.45 In so doing it assures the validity of its im-
plicit criticism: that criminals are released while illegal police
practices continue. The criticism is iterated in an oft-cited pas-
sage given renewed approval by Mr. Chief Justice Burger:
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-
doing official, while it may, and likely will, release the
wrongdoing defendant. It deprives society of its remedy
against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by an-
other. It protects one against whom incriminating evidence
is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons
who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches. 46
Though amenable to further subsets, the passage lodges two
distinct complaints against exclusion: its release of criminals and
its inefficacy.47  The issue of whether the release of criminals is a
price worth paying for deterrence should be clearly distinguished
from the issue of inefficacy. If one presumes the release of
criminals to be a futile gesture, the question of price becomes ir-
relevant. The reasonableness of the price must be assessed on
the assumption that it will secure the purchase desired.
THE PRICE OF EXCLUSION: THE CRIMINAL GOES FREE
"A drastic remedy",48 Chief Justice Burger calls the exclu-
sionary rule, "in view of the high price it extracts from society-
the release of countless guilty criminals."4  Just how high is this
price?
Presumably critics who object to a method of deterrence that
immunizes criminals from prosecution would, nonetheless, re-
includes those who contend it is ineffectual merely by virtue of faulty execu-
tion as well as those who, like Burger, contend it is inherently ineffectual, then
this number undeniably constitutes the majority viewpoint. See, e.g., Burns,
Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969);
Oaks, supra note 38.
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. See text following note 17 supra.
46. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (dis-
senting opinion), quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
47. These complementary alleged shortcomings of exclusion do not, admit-
tedly, exist with mutually total independence. For example, after the initial
spate of defendants freed under the windfall of exclusion, the rule would no
longer release criminals: if police cease their malpractices, there is nought
to exclude.
48. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971). (dissenting opinion).
49. Id. at 416.
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joice if all unlawful police conduct miraculously ceased. Would
not, then, many of these very same criminals escape prosecution?
If they would not have been discovered absent police illegality,
then, in fact, absent any police illegality, they would not be so
discovered. Thus, what does it mean to say these criminals are
"going free"? The release of this category of criminals simply
adds nothing to the net price of exclusion: the payment (no
prosecution) is wholly contained in the purchase (no prosecu-
tion).
Of course, among these "countless guilty criminals" are those
who would or could have been discovered anyway, but who are
released "because the constable has blundered."50  If it is merely
a technicality in that the officer made an honest and reasonable
error, then, since exclusion cannot deter inadvertencies, the rule
should not apply; if it is applied, this is the fault not of the rule
but of the court in so ignoring its-both the court's and the rule's
-purpose. 5' It is the release of these otherwise lawfully discov-
50. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). In this
now famous remark, the usually lucid Benjamin N. Cardozo has engaged in a
rare, if not unique, display of judicial demagoguery. The implicit argument is
geared towards persuasion by outrage rather than reason: "The privacy of the
home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free." Id. at 24, 150 N.E. at
588. In fact, the constable rarely blunders in cases of homicide. See note 39
supra.
Presumably Cardozo is referring to cases in which the criminal would or
could have been discovered absent the "blunder" (so one could not extrapo-
late: "the criminal is caught because the constable blunders"). Of course this
"blunder" must be more substantial than an honest bumbling, or the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply. Infra note 51. Thus we are left with those "blunders"
which are at the heart of the rule: wilful or grossly negligent invasions of Con-
stitutional rights. If the constable could have obtained the evidence legally, why
did he not? This is the point of the exclusionary rule: to prevent these wilful,
unnecessary "blunders". See Justice Traynor's response to Cardozo's complaint.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (1955).
51. One of Burger's criticisms of the exclusionary rule is its application to
those illegalities resulting from "inadvertent errors of judgment." Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
To whatever extent the rule is so used, it is abused. If the purpose of the
rule served as the sole criterion for its application, "inadvertent errors of judg-
ment" would never precipitate use of the sanction unless they were offset by
the Court's own inadvertent error in misjudging the officer's intent. It is not
the "single" and "monolithic" nature of "judicial response," as Burger charac-
terizes it, that permits the senseless exclusion of evidence connected with an in-
advertent violation. On the contrary, it is the multifaceted, pattern-defying na-
ture of judicial responses that permits such results in utter disregard of the pur-
pose of exclusion. Contrary to Burger's sweeping condemnation, not all courts
overlook the distinction between intentional and unintentional breaches; note,
for example, the following by Lumbard, C.J.: "I am particularly unwilling to
exclude . . . because the alleged police improprieties were unintentional and
technical." United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 742 (2d
Cir. 1966) (concurring opinion).
See Note, 115 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 10. This Note advances an
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erable criminals that constitutes the price of exclusion.5"
Balancing Interests
The reasonableness of a price is assessed by weighing the
payment against the purchase. One approach is to pit the indi-
vidual's interest in being secure from unlawful searches against
society's interest in prosecuting criminals. If society's interest is
paramount, why not ignore the fourth amendment altogether? If
everyone were subjected to occasional searches, a prodigious
measure of criminal activity, otherwise invulnerable to detection,
would be exposed. Consider the actual societal interests protected
by the Krauss holding: society's right to regulate what vegetables
an individual ingests-presumably for his own good. Krauss is
not exceptional: most fruit-yielding illegal searches involve vic-
timless crimes.53  Thus, predominantly, the actual interests
weighed are the individual's constitutional right to be left alone
balanced against society's legislative right not to leave him alone.
Ranking the individual's protection from his own foolish in-
dulgences above his protection from governmental intrusion into
Constitutionally guaranteed areas of privacy shows questionable
wisdom.
Viewing the balancing of interests from another perspective
-individual criminality versus police illegality-it is the societal
interest which demands that the former prevail when they con-
flict. The private individual's crime pales before the potential for
destruction unleashed by a government's illegal acts." The Bill
argument for basing exclusion on the relative offensiveness of the violation, a
criterion necessarily based on the wilfulness of the officer's actions.
52. However, not only are these criminals less likely than others to enjoy
the windfall of constabulary blunders [note 39 supra], they are also those most
likely to fall within the purview of an exception to exclusion: to wit, the no-
profit thesis, or some other variant of a "he-could-have-anyway" test, as in
Krauss.
53. Oaks, supra note 38, at 721-22.
54. "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if
it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . . If the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the crimi-
nal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"Compare the number of wrongs committed with impunity by citizens
among us with those committed by the sovereign in other countries, and the
last will be found most numerous, most oppressive on the mind, and most de-
grading the dignity of man." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to De Meunier,
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of Rights was not advanced as a utopian ideal.5 5 The point was
then-and remains-that the gravest danger to a free society lies
in the usurpation of individual liberties by the only body capable
of amassing and sustaining vast power: the government.50
The Police Efficiency Myth
Malfeasance is not uncommonly excused by the court's ex-
pressed desire not to hinder the police in the efficient performance
of their duties. But in Krauss, would police efficiency suffer by
requiring Officer Guevara to refrain from preliminary searches?
In a sense it might, of course, since had the maid's conjectures
been incorrect, Guevara would have sought a warrant in vain.
But this is hardly a hindrance; it is little more than an incon-
venience, a modest price to pay for the corresponding civil liber-
ties thereby secured.57
The very basis for the court's holding in Krauss-that Offi-
cer Guevara could have obtained the evidence without resorting
to the illegal search-belies the rationale that requiring strict com-
pliance with the fourth amendment, via the exclusionary rule or
otherwise, dilutes police efficiency. If Guevara could have pro-
cured the evidence legally, he could have been just as effective
within Constitutional bounds as without. All the standard ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule are based squarely on the offi-
cer's not having increased his efficiency. If efficiency is a posi-
tive virtue to be considered in whether to suppress evidence, then
1786, in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY, 24 (S.K. Padover ed., Pelican
1946).
55. "[T]he Constitution is 'intended to preserve practical and substantial
rights, not to maintain theories.'" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174
(1952), quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1903).
56. Individual liberties are never so secured that vigilance in maintaining
them can be dropped. Once lost, they are seldom recoverable through means
short of revolution. Conversely, governmental powers, once secured, are seldom
relinquished short of revolution. "The inconveniences of the declaration
[Bill of Rights] are, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions. But
the evil of this is short-lived, moderate and reparable. The inconveniences of
the want of a declaration are permanent, afflicting and irreparable." JEFFER-
SON, letter to Madison, 1789, supra note 54, at 50.
57. "The warrant requirement . . . is not an inconvenience to be some-
how 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency." Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to De Meunier in 1786, characterized the in-
convenience this way: "it is difficult to restrain both individuals and States
from committing wrong. This is true, and it is an inconvenience. On the
other hand, that energy which absolute governments derive from an armed force
. . . must be admitted also to have its inconveniences. We weigh the two to-
gether, and like best to submit to the former." THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DE-
MOCRACY, 24 (S.K. Padover ed., Pelican 1946).
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the evidence should be admitted when it would have eluded dis-
covery absent the illegality. That would aid police efficiency.
But since neither the harshest critics of exclusion nor the
most stringent appliers of "but-for" tests to restrict the rule would
propose abrogating the fourth amendment, excluding evidence
not discoverable legally does not in any way detract from police
efficiency. Nor does admitting evidence discoverable anyway
secure for the police any techniques of effective law enforcement
they do not have under even the strictest adherence to fourth
amendment procedures.
Thus, the "police efficiency" argument is illusory, especially
in those very instances it is advanced in opposition to exclusion:
when the police could have secured the questioned evidence le-
gally. The only question is whether the police will be efficient
legally or efficient illegally.
The Election: Whether to Attack the Public or the Private
Wrongdoing
Since courts accept Constitutional restraints on police prac-
tices, no court in choosing to discount the official misconduct in-
tends thereby to lend its approval to further misconduct just be-
cause it would aid police efficiency. Police efficiency is not really
the issue. The issue is narrower and more immediate. The effi-
ciency concerns only the ability to prosecute the particular defend-
ant. Essentially the decision to discount the malfeasance rests on
the feeling that the police illegality is in the past, over and done
with, the damage done; but the private illegality is discovered,
despite the means, and something can still be done about it. This
viewpoint misses the parallel between the two illegal acts. The
private transgression is every bit as much an accomplished fact as
the public one, and nothing can rectify either. The only ques-
tion is which transgression to punish. The issue of exclusion
often requires the court, in effect, to excuse either the public ille-
gality or the private illegality. Its choice should reflect the rela-
tive gravity of the two offenses. So viewed, the private wrong-
doing should always be excused over the public one.
Consider what is at stake in the choice. A criminal's release
before prosecution has a negligible impact on society.5" He will
be released anyway, in time; and there is no reason to believe that
58. The safety predominantly at stake in releasing criminals is not that of
the public, but that of the criminal himself: the majority of illegal searches in-
volve victimless crimes. Oaks, supra note 38, at 721-22. Perpetrators of seri-
ous crimes are least likely to enjoy the windfall of the exclusionary rule. Id.
at 731-32.
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after a fine or incarceration, he will be less inclined towards crim-
inality than had he avoided prosecution altogether. Nor will his
escape from prosecution foster a crime-does-pay cynicism, en-
couraging him to further misdeeds: he is powerless to contrive
the conditions necessary for exclusion. The impact of his release
is confined to the act itself: one criminal escapes prosecution for
one crime. This is the price of exclusion. The price of admis-
sion, orn the other hand, is not similarly confined. Unlike a
statutory offense, the police illegality is defined only by court de-
cisions. Thus each decision describing the effectual bounds of
police conduct serves as a model for police practices throughout
the jurisdiction. The potential impact of excusing the police ille-
gality extends far beyond the specific transgression before the
court. Policemen, quite understandably, will utilize whatever law
enforcement tools are available.
Since: 1) the unlawful act of a government agent consti-
tutes a graver threat to society than that of a private citizen, and
2) the failure to penalize the former effectively condones the act and
encourages others to commit it,5" while failure to penalize
the latter neither condones the act nor encourages its repetition;
then: if penalizing one precludes penalizing the other, the official
transgression should, as a matter of course, be penalized. If ex-
clusion works, the release of criminals is a negligible investment
in view of its return potential. The price is more than reasona-
ble. It is cheap.
The issue, then, is not the price, but the efficacy of exclusion.
In judging this, one might consider the corresponding efficacy of
prosecution. Both exclusion and prosecution are designed to
deter illegality. If exclusion discourages more illegality than the
corresponding prosecutions-were they not displaced-would dis-
courage, then can exclusion be judged other than effective?
THE INEFFICACY OF AN UNTRIED REMEDY
If Wright believes, as another Chief Justice does, that the ef-
ficacy of the exclusionary rule is just a "wistful dream"'6 , Krauss
demonstrates the adage that believing makes it so. Subject the
Krauss holding to the law-making equivalent of Kant's categorical
59. The author is aware of no critic who would contest the import of this
statement: that failure to take any action against illegal police practices func-
tions as a default endorsement of these practices, and they will, for at least
the same reasons that they were ever instigated, flourish. The controversy is
not whether something should be done to penalize and thus deter these prac-
tices, but what should be done.
60. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 '(1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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imperative: what if everybody did it? Under such circum-
stances, the exclusionary rule would fail to deter unlawful searches.
But is it the exclusionary rule itself, as originally conceived and
generally understood, that fails? Krauss' application of it fails,
but, then, Krauss is not applying the exclusionary rule.
By definition, the exclusionary rule requires the suppression
of evidence derived from an illegal search. Its purpose is clear:
to discourage illegal searches. When there has been an illegal
search and contraband connected with that search is introduced as
evidence, the question of suppression should, logically, turn on
only one consideration: the purpose of exclusion. The formula
based on the purpose of the rule could not be clearer: will admis-
sion encourage, or exclusion discourage, illegal conduct by law
enforcement personnel? Applied to the facts in Krauss, the ques-
tion compels an affirmative response. In admitting the evidence,
Krauss decidely encourages warrantless searches. Can it properly
be maintained that Krauss is applying the exclusionary rule when
the holding patently promotes that very conduct the rule was de-
signed to counter?
Pronouncements that police shall not "benefit" or "profit"
from their wrongdoing;"' or about "purging or dissipating the
61. Krauss v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 418, 424-26, 487 P.2d 1023, 1027-
29, 96 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459-61 (1971) (Peters, J., dissenting); People v. Johnson,
70 Cal. 2d 541, 551, 450 P.2d 865, 871, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1969); People v.
Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757, 763, 401 P.2d 921, 924, 44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 316(1965) ("That the Prosecutor may not profit directly or indirectly from an
illegal search has been the keystone of the rule excluding illegally obtained evi-
dence"); R. Maguire, supra note 10, at 311-13.
The articulated correlation between official profit from the illegality and
the function of exclusion remains unchallenged. It is advanced with such
breadth and frequency, that it enjoys the virtual status of a truism, an unques-
tioned corollary to the deterrent rationale for exclusion. As R. Maguire points
out, unless the admission of evidence allows the government "to profit by the
improper acts of its officials ...the reason for invoking the exclusionary rule
disappears." Id. at 312.
This thesis may appear harmless enough, notwithstanding its validity. But
no, it is neither harmless nor valid. It constitutes one of those insidious re-
statements on the function of exclusion that supersede that function, and from
which secondary formulae are extracted. However often this profit thesis may
accord with the deterrent rationale for exclusion, it still accords less often than
the deterrent rationale itself does. And because it is not an identity with the
goal of exclusion, formulae derived from it will even less often correspond with
the purpose of exclusion.
The "inevitable discovery", "but-for" and "sine qua non" tests are logical
derivatives of the no-profit thesis: if the officer could or would have se-
cured the evidence legally, what profit has he secured from the illegality? He
has gained nothing over what he could have had legally. Peters supports this
logic in his dissent by asserting that the majority holding provides the great-
est benefit to those officers who warrantlessly search on mere hunches; and
that warrantless searches conducted with probable cause provide the least profit
since the officer must ultimately get a warrant anyway and thus is neither saved
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taint", 2 "unpoisoning the fruit",6" the "inevitable discovery",
"but-for", or "sine qua non" tests;64 the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" 5 and "attenuation" 66-all these secondarily or tertiarily de-
rived formulae for mandating suppression succeed only in mud-
dying the issue they purport to clarify. Why the formula inherent
in the rule's raison d'etre needs clarification in terms other than
its own is mystifying.
The aggregate of individual exceptions destroys the rule-like
quality of the rule. When the rule is applied in a hundred diverse
and conflicting ways, what does it mean to conclude that the rule
has failed? As applied, it has failed. Were its application con-
sistent and clear, then we should understand just what it is that
has failed. Police can hardly be expected to predetermine what
conduct will jeopardize thd admissibility of evidence when the
courts themselves cannot agree.6 7  The spectre of exclusion can-
a burden nor granted a profit he would not otherwise have. See discussion
accompanying note 37 supra.
Ironically-and yet illustrative of how thoroughly entrenched the no-profit
thesis is, and of how chameleonic the purposes it can serve-the target of Peters'
criticism is itself grounded in the no-profit thesis. In effect, Wright's opinion
manipulates the elements of the Wong Sun test in terms of profit: one cannot
exploit an illegality if the same ends are attainable legally; a showing, via the
magistrate's determination, that Guevara could have searched legally means that
no profit was secured by searching illegally; this same showing, establishing no
profit from the illegality, serves to purge the taint of the illegality, the taint be-
ing nought but the odor of profit.
The confusion and misunderstanding fostered by appending criteria like
"profit" to the uncontroverted basis for exclusion are set off by no advan-
tages accruing from such appendages. The profit thesis in no way clarifies
the exclusionary rule. The discrepancy between the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Krauss-both supporting a profit theory of exclusion-points up the
insidiousness of this standard.
62. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486-88 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096,
1105, 458 P.2d 713, 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1969); People v. Johnson,
70 Cal. 2d 541, 548, 554, 450 P.2d 865, 869, 873-74, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405,
409-10 (1969); People v. Kanos, 70 Cal. 2d 381, 386, 450 P.2d 278, 282, 74
Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1969); Raymond v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 321,
326-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1971); Krauss v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App.
3d 793, 801, 88 Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (1970); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF
GUILT 221 (1959); Pitler, supra note 10, at 588-89.
63. See generally R. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit, supra note 10.
64. Id. at 313-17; Pitler, supra note 10, at 627-30. See notes 10 & 61
supra.
65. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. See also note 62 supra.
66. See discussion on attenuation in text following note 15 supra. See par-
ticularly notes 16, 21 & 62 supra.
67. La Fave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule
-Part H1: Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REV. 566
(1965); See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The Krauss case itself suggests the dilemma the courts have fashioned for the
policeman. Not only did the majority of the eleven jurists passing on Krauss'
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not influence behavior when exclusion appears capricious, eluding
prediction and any perceptible pattern between the conduct con-
demned and the act of condemnation.' 8
Courts do agree on what conduct the rule is supposed to
condemn. Yet they persist in basing exclusion on almost any-
thing but the illegal act itself. Ignoring the question of deter-
rence, courts frequently flail at targets collateral to the illegal act,
and thus effectively deem some illegal acts less illegal than others.
Krauss, in excepting warrantless searches based on cause from
the sanction of exclusion, advances an offensiveness scale for ille-
gal searches, not unlike the pre-Mapp v. Ohio "shock-the-con-
science" distinction:69 that exclusion is aimed at unreasonable
searches, not illegal ones; and that the reasonable, though war-
rantless, search is a minor invasion of Constitutional rights since
the search could have been made anyway and the criminal in-
vited the search by virtue of his criminality. A corollary is
echoed in Burger's lament that exclusion "protects one against
whom incriminating evidence is discovered but does nothing to
protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless
searches."" °  This plaint implies that criminals (yet unconvicted)
do not deserve the same Constitutional protections non-criminals
do; it classifies official miscounduct according to the culpability
of its victim, with the primary concern reserved for searches per-
petrated against the innocent, to the denigration of those per-
petrated against the guilty. Coupled with the belief that action
taken against the latter "does nothing" to affect the incidence of
motion to suppress disagree with the final judgment, so apparently, did Sergeant
Guevara disagree. His conduct indicates that he had thought his search would
be penalized by the exclusionary rule. In view of his distinguished com-
rades in error, he can hardly be faulted for his miscalculation.
68. Accord, La Fave, supra note 67; Oaks, supra note 38, at 731; Note, 115
U. PA. L. REV., supra note 10, at 1147. See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and
Section 2255, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 390 (1964).
69. Prior to its decision enforcing the exclusionary rule against the States
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court would mandate sup-
pression in state cases only when the unlawful conduct was such that "'shocks
the conscience', offends 'a sense of justice' or runs counter to the 'decencies
of civilized conduct.'" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952)
(Black, J., concurring). In thus imposing this limited restraint upon the states'
otherwise unfettered power to flout the fourth amendment, the Court had bi-
furcated the right to be secure from unreasonable searches with gradations of
unreasonableness. A wilful violation of fourth amendment guarantees was not in
itself of such Constitutional offensiveness to warrant federal interference: there
must also have been "additional aggravating conduct which the court finds re-
pulsive." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 144-45, (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
70. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the former, this double standard precludes even the possibility
that exclusion might work.
This end-justifies-the-means approach to illegal searches, re-
flected in Krauss, contains all the elements necessary to defeat the
exclusionary rule. If the illegality can be cured by an ex post
facto warrant, or mitigated by the guilt of its victim, then the ille-
gality must be considered less offensive than the crime it un-
covers. If the goal of prosecuting crime can justify illegal means,
then the goal of discouraging those illegal means cannot justify
immunizing crime from prosecution. A more basic hostility to
exclusion is hardly possible. The exclusionary rule, as well as
the fourth amendment, is predicated on the exact converse of
these means and ends.
The difference between a fruitful and a fruitless search is
revealed only after the intrusion is a fait accompli. The offending
officer rarely knows beforehand whether the search will yield evi-
dence of criminality. The intrusion upon those innocent victims
of fruitless searches is identical to that upon those guilty victims
of fruitful searches. The quality of the intrusion itself cannot be
cured by subsequent events-nor is it essentially altered by pre-
ceeding ones: the intrusion is at best a necessary evil, to be
deemed necessary only by the procedure set out in the same Con-
stitutional amendment that deems it evil.71 The only way to at-
tack illegal searches is to attack illegal searches.
CONCLUSION
Krauss exemplifies the source of the failure of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. The sole question before the court
in Krauss is whether certain evidence should be excluded. Yet in
divining its decision, the court considers not at all the purpose of
exclusion. The opinion turns on considerations collateral to the
unlawful conduct itself, and in total disregard for how or even
whether exclusion or admission might affect future police prac-
tices.
The criteria for applying the exclusionary rule will determine
its effects. If its goal is not the determinant of exclusion, then
exclusion will effect something other than that goal. The exclu-
sionary rule has not failed. It simply has not been tried.
Rosamond Miller French
71. "The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seiz-
ure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior deter-
mination of necessity." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971).
1972]
